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1 Introduction
If we place in the General Theory (Keynes, 1936) the origin of Macroeconomics
proper, that is, the analysis of the economy as a whole on the basis of a general
equilibrium model simplified by aggregation, we must admit that imperfect com-
petition is present from the beginning in the history of macroeconomic theory.
Indeed, unemployment – the main theme of the General Theory – can hardly be
approached, except as concerns its frictional component, if the labour market is
assumed to be perfectly competitive. Accordingly, even if Keynes does not pro-
vide a complete analysis of wage determination, money wages explicitly appear
– already in the Treatise on Money – as the result of contractual arrangements
between entrepreneurs and workers, typically represented by trade unions.1 Be-
sides, the General Theory also assumes imperfect competition in the product
markets, although in a discrete and simplified way characterized by a constant
degree of competition.2
Yet, it is the development of another major theme of macroeconomic theory,
business cycles, that pushed imperfectly competitive output markets to the fore,
principally under the lead of Harrod, who began to write on the trade cycle in
1925 and on imperfect competition in 1927, building a bridge between the two
fields in the articles “Doctrines of Imperfect Competition” (Harrod, 1934), and
“Imperfect Competition and the Trade Cycle” (Harrod, 1936a) just before the
publication in the same year of his essay on the Trade Cycle (Harrod, 1936b)
(cf. Besomi, 2003). Both Harrod and Keynes were referring at the same time
to a supposed feature of business cycles, namely the countercyclicality of real
wages, which was however going to be contested two years later by statistical
observations, principally collected by Dunlop (1938). This empirical evidence,
as well as other more speculative considerations, induced an important flow of
theoretical arguments developed by several authors in a very short period, at the
eve of the second World War, and involving the reciprocal influences of output
market power and economic fluctuations. This kind of arguments completely
disappeared after the war from the forefront of economic analysis, in both fields
of industrial organisation and macroeconomics.
We propose to examine these aborted guidelines from the late thirties, which
appear quite significant today because they already exhibit the main ingredients
of the New Keynesian research programme developed one half century later: im-
perfectly competitive goods markets (with costly price adjustment, economies of
scale and cyclical behaviour of markups on marginal costs), imperfectly compet-
itive labour markets (with wage negotiations, implicit contracts and efficiency
wages), and finally coordination failures (cf. Mankiw and Romer, 1991).
Section 2 starts with the arguments for the countercyclicality of real wages,
1Cf. Keynes (1930), 1, pp. 149-153, and (1936), pp. 7-13.
2In the published version of the General Theory, Keynes “take[s] as given [...] the degree
of competition” (Keynes, 1936, p. 245, our emphasis), not necessarily the maximal one. His
position with respect to such less than perfect competition in the output markets has evolved
since the first proof of the book (cf. Keynes, 1973, II, p. 502). Cf. also the comment on ‘the
first postulate’ of the Classical Economics as formulated in the published version (Keynes,
1936, p. 5), and in the first and second proofs (Keynes, 1973, II, pp. 352-353).
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as expressed in Keynes’ and Harrod’s writings, and the evidence that was given
later to show that it was a mistaken belief. In section 3, we pursue with the
determinants of wage formation as discussed by Dunlop (1938) and examine
the influence of employment on money wages. Section 4 will be devoted to the
rigidity of output prices and the variability of collusive behaviour by oligopolis-
tic firms along the cycle, which are two important reasons for countercyclical
markups and, hence, for the statistical rejection of Keynes’ conjecture, and
which are also the main themes of several important papers of the late thirties.
2 A contested “stylised fact” in the light of im-
perfect competition
At the beginning of the General Theory, Keynes formulated the conjecture that
the change in real wages is almost always in the opposite direction of a change
in money wages. This supposed feature of the trade cycle would nowadays be
called a “stylised fact”, following Kaldor (1961):
“In choosing a particular theoretical approach, [the theorist] ought to start off with a
summary of facts which he regards as relevant to his problem. Since facts, as recorded
by statisticians, are always subject to numerous snags and qualifications, and for that
reason are incapable of being accurately summarised, the theorist, in my view, should
be free to start off with a ‘stylised’ view of the facts – i.e. concentrate on broad ten-
dencies, ignoring individual details, and proceed on the ‘as if’ method, i.e. construct
a hypothesis that could account for these ‘stylised’ facts, without necessarily commit-
ting himself to the historical accuracy, or sufficiency, of the facts or tendencies thus
summarised” (Kaldor, 1961, p. 178).
Keynes’ conjectural stylised fact would result from two hypothesized relation-
ships between employment and wages: one positive concerning money wages,
the other negative concerning real wages. The fact was however soon rejected
on the basis of statistical observations, determining a reexamination of these
underlying relationships in the light of imperfect competition. We will devote
the first subsection to this question.
In the same year, in his paper “Imperfect competition and the trade cycle”,
Harrod (1936a) also started by enumerating a few stylised facts (“features of
the trade cycle [that] are taken for granted as established by wide observation”),
namely the procyclicality of three classes of variables: money rewards to prime
factors, commodity prices, and profits, in increasing order of amplitude of their
fluctuations. These facts imply the stylised fact conjectured by Keynes, as well
as the two underlying relationships between employment and wages. Harrod’s
own justification for this stylised fact provoked an immediate and large discus-
sion, examined in the second subsection.
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2.1 Keynes’ conjectured correlation of real and money
wages
Keynes’ conjecture is stated and justified in chapter 2 of the General Theory :
“It would be interesting to see the results of a statistical enquiry into the actual re-
lationship between changes in money-wages and changes in real wages. In the case of
a change peculiar to a particular industry one would expect the change in real wages
to be in the same direction as the change in money-wages. But in the case of changes
in the general level of wages, it will be found, I think, that the change in real wages
associated with a change in money-wages, so far from being usually in the same direc-
tion, is almost always in the opposite direction. When money-wages are rising, that is
to say, it will be found that real wages are falling; and when money-wages are falling,
real wages are rising. This is because, in the short period, falling money-wages and
rising real wages are each, for independent reasons, likely to accompany decreasing
employment; labour being readier to accept wage-cuts when employment is falling off,
yet real wages inevitably rising in the same circumstances on account of the increasing
marginal return to a given capital equipment when output is diminished” (Keynes,
1936, pp. 9-10).
This passage is recalled by Keynes (1939) in his reply to two articles providing
the statistical inquiry he called for. The first article is by Dunlop who, as a
graduate student on a fellowship for a year in Cambridge, examined the question
using the British data for the period 1860-1937. His paper, the draft of which
was read and commented in a letter by Keynes (see Dunlop, 1998), was published
in the Economic Journal, September 1938. The second article is by Tarshis, who
had the privilege to follow Keynes’ lectures during the four years preceding the
publication of the General Theory. It is a short note based on U.S. monthly data
for the period 1932-1938 and published in the Economic Journal, March 1939.
Both authors are refuting Keynes’ conjecture. Dunlop reaches the following
conclusion:
“Increases in wage rates have usualy been associated with increased real wage rates,
while decreases in wage rates have equally often been associated wˆıth a rise or fall in
real wage rates” (Dunlop, 1938, p. 421).
Tarshis reaches the even stronger conclusion that,
“when money wages are rising, it is generally found that real wages are rising, and
when money wages are falling, real wages are usually falling” (Tarshis, 1939, p. 153).
However, as already mentioned by Keynes in the passage quoted above, and
as repeated in the 1939 article, the relationship supposed to be observed between
the movements of real and money wages should be deduced from two hypoth-
esized relations: one, concerning the product markets, between real wages and
output, the other, concerning the labour market, between money wages and
employment. Real wages W/P should be decreasing, and money-wages W in-
creasing, when output or employment N is rising:
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W ←−−→ W/P
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Keynes’s argument goes as follows. Money wages are assumed to decrease in
response to a decrease in output and employment (“labour being readier to
accept wage-cuts when employment is falling off”).3 This is what Keynes calls an
induced (as opposed to spontaneous) change in money wages (Keynes, 1930, 1, p.
151). On the other hand, for such a decrease in output to respond to a decrease
in effective demand, and taking into account the assumption of a decreasing
short-run marginal product of labour, real wages have to increase (“real wages
inevitably rising in the same circumstances on account of the increasing marginal
return to a given capital equipment when output is diminished”). Then, at short
period equilibrium, we get the conjectured inverse relation between money and
real wages.
In all this argument the most important ingredient will appear to be the
negative relation between real wages and output. For Keynes, this negative
relation should not be viewed as a way to justify the benefit of an expansionary
policy stimulating effective demand and pushing prices up. The associated fall in
real wages should on the contrary be viewed as a regrettable side effect, not as a
sacrifice to be accepted by the working classes in order to increase employment.
He only admitted this side effect because it fitted a “belief [...] widely held
by British economists up to the last year or two” (Keynes, 1939, p. 394),
“the question of the influence on real wages of periods of boom and depression
[having] a long history” (ibid., p.395). This belief in the countercyclicality of
real wages goes back at least to Marshall’s memoranda for the Gold and Silver
Commission in 1887, and for the Indian Currency Committee in 1899, and
extends to Pigou (in the Theory of Unemployment, 1933). However,
“Like Marshall, Prof. Pigou based his conclusion primarily on the stickiness of money
wages relatively to prices. But my own readiness to accept the prevailing generalisation,
at the time when I was writing my General Theory, was much influenced by an a`
priori argument, which had recently won wide acceptance, to be found in Mr. R. F.
Kahn’s article on ‘The Relation of Home Investment to Employment,’ published in the
Economic Journal for June 1931. The supposed empirical fact, that in the short period
real wages tend to move in the opposite direction to the level of output, appeared, that
is to say, to be in conformity with the more fundamental generalisations that industry
is subject to increasing marginal cost in the short period, that for a closed system as
a whole marginal cost in the short period is substantially the same thing as marginal
wage cost, and that in competitive conditions prices are governed by marginal cost”
(Keynes, 1939, pp. 399-400).
3Symmetrically, “since each group of workers will gain, cet. par., by a rise in its own wages,
there is naturally for all groups a pressure in this direction, which entrepreneurs will be more
ready to meet when they are doing better business” (Keynes, 1936, p.301).
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Hence, if the negative relation between employment and real wages is to be
discarded, one has to move from a closed to an open system, from short to long
period or, principally, from perfect to imperfect competition, so as to open the
way either to decreasing marginal cost, or to disconnected changes in prices and
marginal costs because of a variable degree of competition.
Tarshis comments precisely on the non-realistic character of Keynes’ assump-
tion “that increases in output [...] are associated with rising marginal costs, even
in the absence of rises in money wages” (Tarshis, 1939, p. 153), as well as of
Keynes’ assumption of a constant degree of competition. However, after giving
evidence of a positive correlation between real hourly wages and money earnings
per hour, he concludes in a postscript that “changes in real hourly wages are
in general opposite in direction from changes in man-hours of work” (Tarshis,
1939, p. 154). This leaves us with the new following picture of the three re-
lationships, with an implied negative relation between employment and money
wages:
+
W ←−−→ W/P
− ↘↖ ↙ −
N
The same kind of agreement-disagreement results from Dunlop’s analysis, re-
futing Keynes’ conjecture on the basis of statistical observations, yet accepting
(with qualifications) the positive relation between employment and money wages
defended by Keynes. He consequently must admit a positive association of real
wages with output:
+
W ←−−→ W/P
+↖ ↙↗ +
N
In their refutation of Keynes’s conjecture, the two authors thus offer different
explanations while agreeing (followed by Keynes, 1939) that, among all the
reasons that can be set forth against the conjecture, the main one is possibly
the unrealistic character of the perfect competition assumption on the product
markets. Imperfect competition should be introduced in order to modify two
of Keynes’ original assumptions, increasing marginal cost and constant degree
of competition. These modifications are sketched by Keynes himself. As to the
first,
“[...] if we start from a level of output very greatly below capacity, so that even the
most efficient plant and labour are only partially employed, marginal real cost may be
expected to decline with increasing output, or, at the worst, remain constant” (Keynes,
1939, p. 405).
If we take the marginal real cost as approximately constant (and equal to average
real cost) up to the point of normal capacity, we get the familiar reverse L-shaped
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cost curve introduced by Kalecki (1938), in a paper quoted by both Dunlop and
Keynes. Going further, and assuming decreasing real marginal costs in the short
period, is of course “possible only with the existence of monopoly or imperfect
competition,” otherwise “enterprises must close down or maintain such a degree
of employment that the marginal cost is higher than the average cost” (Kalecki,
1938, pp. 102-103).
As to the second modification of his original assumptions, which consists in
admitting a variable degree of competition, Keynes writes:
“There remains the question whether the mistake lies in the approximate identification
of marginal cost with price, or rather in the assumption that for output as a whole
they bear a more or less proportionate relationship to one another irrespective of the
intensity of output. For it may be the case that the practical workings of the laws
of imperfect competition in the modern quasi-competitive system are such that, when
output increases and money wages rise, prices rise less than in proportion to the increase
in marginal money cost” (Keynes, 1939, p 406).
Assuming prices to rise “less than in proportion to the increase in marginal
money cost” directly contradicts one of the stylised facts put forward by Harrod
(1936a), as we will examine now.
2.2 Harrod’s “law of diminishing elasticity of demand”
Harrod presents as one of the main features of the trade cycle “the fact that
the commodity price fluctuation has greater amplitude than that of (money)
rewards to prime factors” (Harrod, 1936a, p. 84). If prime factors are restricted
to labour, and since money wages and prices are both supposed procyclical,
Harrod’s stylised fact is equivalent to Keynes’ hypothesized procyclicality of
money wages and countercyclicality of real wages. It implies that either real
marginal costs or markups on money marginal costs are themselves procyclical:
“...the fulfillment of the marginal condition (marginal revenue = marginal cost) requires
that, within the ambit of the cycle, work costs rise and fall with rises and falls in output
and/or the ratio of marginal revenues to prices falls and rises with rises and falls in
output” (Harrod, 1936a, p. 85).
The novelty with respect to Keynes’ initial position is that the first alter-
native, that of rising marginal costs, is not taken by Harrod as the relevant
explanation for the stylised fact. Already in the paper “Doctrines of imper-
fect competition” published two years before, he emphasized the importance of
imperfect competition for trade cycle theory, because of its compatibility with
decreasing costs:
“The key which the doctrines of imperfect competition provide for solving the mystery
[concerning movements away from the general equilibrium of output] is that [...] indus-
tries may be subject to the law of decreasing costs (in the long and short periodes)”
(Harrod, 1934, p. 465).
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Decreasing costs undermine equilibrium stability, with the consequence that
cycles in a stationary environment do not have to be ascribed to errors in pro-
ducers’ expectations, and may on the contrary be approached as an equilibrium
phenomenon:
“If, on the other hand, imperfect competition, decreasing costs and the absence of a
stable equilibrium in the general level of output as a whole are recognized, the psycho-
logical theory becomes a valid explanation of trade cycle phenomena without reference
to error at all. There being various levels at which, if industries attain them con-
jointly, they will be in equilibrium with one another, a depressed mentality leads to the
choice of a lower instead of a higher level. The lower level is as rational as the higher
one. Provided that a number of producers are depressed and recognize the existence
of depression in each other, rational choice demands restriction by each. Nor do they
subsequently recognize that their action was erroneous, for they attain an equilibrium
at the new level and are under no stimulus to reexpand” (Harrod, 1934, pp. 469-70).
This passage is important, because Harrod is defending an equilibrium approach
to business cycles, based on a rational expectations hypothesis: “the prolonged
persistence of [...] errors is surely an unreasonable hypothesis” (ibid., p. 470).
This approach relies upon the existence of multiple long period equilibria, which
may result from alternative producers’ (correct) expectations. Optimism and
pessimism lead respectively to high and low equilibrium outputs, anticipating
the idea of coordination failures in the New Keynesian literature (Cooper and
John, 1988).
It is thus clear that decreasing marginal costs play a major role in Harrod’s
theoretical approach to the trade cycle. This is reinforced by two empirical
observations, first that, within the slump, “it is quite unusual for marginal prime
costs to rise until the point of normal capacity is reached” (the same argument
as the one used by Kalecki, Dunlop and Keynes, mentioned above), and then
that, “within the course of the boom, plant is rapidly extended”, making “the
period to which [diminishing returns apply] too short for trade cycle analysis”
(Harrod, 1936a, p. 86).
Since decreasing marginal costs lead to a positive relation between real wages
and employment, Harrod’s stylised fact (equivalent to the Keynes’ conjecture)
can only subsist if the markup on marginal cost, or the degree of monopoly
(Lerner, 1934), varies procyclically. The reciprocal of the Lerner index, equal
in monopolistic competition to the elasticity of demand, must consequently de-
crease on the upswing. This is expressed in Harrod’s “Law of Diminishing
Elasticity of Demand” (Harrod, 1936b), resulting from the fact that the ex-
pected value for a consumer of searching for better opportunities among close
substitutes is supposedly a decreasing function of his income.
Harrod’s conclusion was however not accepted in general.4 More impor-
tantly, two crucial countervailing factors were immediately pointed out by J.
Robinson (1936) in her review of Harrod’s essay on the trade cycle (Harrod,
1936b), namely the variability along the cycle of both the number of active
4Cf. Sumner (1940) for a review of the principal arguments.
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firms (hence of the degree of concentration) and of their aptitude to collude,
both affecting the degree of monopoly:
“The degree of monopoly does not depend only on the imperfection of the market for
a commodity, but also on the number of separate units of control engaged in selling it,
and, since the fear of loss is more powerful than the hope of gain, the tendency towards
restrictive combinations is stronger in a slump than in a boom” (Robinson, 1936, pp.
59-60).
In section 4, we shall come back in particular to the second of these counter-
vailing factors, emphasized by Kalecki (1938), Abramovitz (1938) or Dunlop
(1938). But let us now reconsider more deeply the relation N → W between
employment and money wages, as discussed by Dunlop (1938).
3 Money wages along the cycle
Of the two relations underlying Keynes’ conjecture, Dunlop retains the influence
of employment on money wages. But, even if he shares Keynes’ view that
“money wage rates [should be] regarded as a function of trade-union strength,
which in turn is a function of employment” (Dunlop, 1938, p. 431), he concludes
that
“while changes in employment are more closely associated with changes in wage rates,
important deviations remain. There seems to be no simple relation – and especially of a
causal nature – adequate to summarise the two movements without very wide margins
of error” (Dunlop, 1938, p 432).
This conclusion results from a careful empirical inquiry on trade-union be-
haviour in the context of wage bargaining, followed by a thorough discussion of
the employer’s point of view.
3.1 The trade-union attitude
Dunlop’s objective is “to discover, if possible, certain central tendencies in trade-
union wage policy and some indication of the deviation from these tendencies”
(Dunlop, 1938, p. 422). First he insists, even more than Keynes, that “the
trade-union leadership resists money wage reductions – to the point of strike
– ‘whenever possible’,” because such reductions “have the tendency to spread”
like an “infection” (to different categories of workers, different firms, different
industries, and so on). They also tend to be repeated, and are in general difficult
to restore when trade improves.
He then considers the “purchasing power” argument often developed by the
unions to justify the resistance to wage cuts:
“It is most frequently argued that a cut in wage rates reduces ‘purchasing power’, and
therefore leaves the employer and the community (shopkeepers are frequently men-
tioned) in just as bad, if not a worse situation” (Dunlop, 1938, p.423).
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Dunlop, quoting a letter written by an employer to a Member of Parliament in
1739, recalls the very long standing of this argument. This is related to what is
now called the Ford or income feedback effect (Hart, 1985, d’Aspremont et al.,
1989) put forward by Henry Ford to justify a policy of high wages:
“I believe in the first place that [...] our own sales depend in a measure upon the wages
we pay. If we can distribute high wages, then that money is going to be spent and it will
serve to make storekeepers and distributors and manufacturers and workers in other
lines more prosperous and their properity will be reflected in our sales. Country-wide
high wages spell country-wide prosperity, provided, however, the higher wages are paid
for higher production” (Ford, 1922, pp. 124-5).
Conversely, lower wages entail less purchasing power from a given number of
employees, and thus tend to depress, mainly indirectly, the demand addressed
to the employers. The purchasing power argument can thus be used by trade-
unions both to justify their resistance to wage cuts and to ask for an advance in
wage rates. However, Dunlop insists on the asymmetry in trade-union behaviour
between the ‘no reductions’ policy and the wage-rate advance policy in relation
to his statistical findings summarized above.
An aspect of this asymmetry is the importance of the cost of living argument
for wage-rate advances (“the cost of living has gone up and an advance in wage
rates is therefore justified”, p. 425), which, reinforced by other arguments,
like the purchasing power, the improvement of profits, or the technical changes
arguments, entails a rise in real wages in the upswing (although may be not at
the very start of the upswing, since negotiations take some time). As for the
‘no-reductions’ policy, it should imply a rise in real wages in the first part of
a depression “until a phase of the depression is reached when great pressure is
characteristically brought to bear by employers against wage rates. Then real
wage rates might be expected to fall” (p. 425). And Dunlop concludes on cost
of living as a trade-union argument:
“If to such an exceedingly complex problem in social motivation each person were
entitled to one guess, mine would be that the cost of living has been less important
than a survey of wage negotiations would indicate, but considerably more important
than Mr. Keynes’ position would admit” (Dunlop, 1938, p. 428).
3.2 The employer’s point of view
As stressed by Dunlop, one should however take also into account “the em-
ployer’s point of view” in this negotiation process, both as an employer, that
is, as a demander on the labour market, and as a supplier (and a competitor)
on the product market, who, as such, may be inclined to adopt a stable wage
rate policy in spite of an employment decline. In this respect, Dunlop appears
as a precursor of the efficiency wage hypothesis, with its sociological (Akerlof,
1982, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) and labour turnover foundations (Stiglitz, 1974,
Salop, 1979):
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“The employer may judge the decrease in wage rates possible − in view of trade-union
strength − to be not worth the loss in ‘morale’ which would have an adverse effect
on output. Wage-earners may be less careful, or may even curtail their rate of effort
deliberately” (Dunlop, 1938, p. 428).
“The extra wages may be regarded as an investment in a more efficient working force
for the future, by preserving a group of working-men intact in the present” (Dunlop,
1938, pp. 428-429).
There are still other factors presented by Dunlop “which may lead employers
to adopt a policy of ‘more stable’ wage rates.” Such are the attempt to avoid
destructive strikes, the relief of the downward pressure on wages resulting from
the layoff of the least efficient workers, or the use of long term wage contracts:
“The existence of wage contracts and agreements which run for a period of years have a
tendency to reduce the frequency and amplitude of wage-rate changes” (Dunlop, 1938,
p. 429).
This may be seen as an anticipation of the “implicit contract” approach (Azari-
adis and Stiglitz, 1983).
Finally, Dunlop considers strategic objectives of the employers, concerning
their competitors in the product markets, and involving an advertising effect
(a ‘good’ employer attracts more customers) and a contamination effect (lower
wages spread and imply lower costs for the competitors too, opening the way
to price reductions):
“If a considerable proportion of sales are to working-class people, an employer may
further advertise that he is a ‘good’ employer, and thereby actually shift his individual
demand curve to the right, at the expense of competitors” (Dunlop, 1938, p. 428).
“A reduction of wages in one firm may tend to make easier a reduction of prices else-
where in the industry, as the wage reductions spread” (Dunlop, 1938, p. 429).
All these elements of the analysis of the labour market are clearly helpful
in understanding wage rigidities, or more generally the fact that the relation
N → W between changes in employment and changes in wage rates may not
have been so tight as it was assumed by Keynes. But, in order to explain why
real wages may display some procyclicality, that is, in order to reconsider the
relation W/P → N , one has to examine further interdependencies between the
labour and the output markets, pushing the latter to the front stage.
4 Markups and prices along the cycle
Procyclicality of real wages may be partly due to decreasing marginal costs,
as already observed in section 2. We want however to concentrate now on the
countercyclicality of markups on marginal costs5 as the main reason for the sta-
tistical rejection of Keynes’ conjecture (and, of course, of Harrod’s equivalent
5Bils (1987) offers one of the first instances of the New Keynesian approach to this question.
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stylised fact). This might simply result from the assumption that demand elas-
ticity varies in the same sense as income (contrary to Harrod’s law): “people
with decreased money incomes and increased concern for their economic secu-
rity are less rather than more responsive to lower prices” (Galbraith, 1936, p.
463). Two other reasons for countercyclical markups were however going to play
a more important role in the discussion:
“A number of factors combine to make for an increase in the “degree of monopoly”
during the depression and a decrease during the boom. With “rigid prices” in many
sectors of the economy, a rise in wage rates during the upswing tends to reduce the
“degree of monopoly.” It is argued that the liquidation of cartel organisations and the
disappearance of fear of retaliation for not following a price leader make for similar
results” (Dunlop, 1938, pp. 432-433).
We will successively consider these two factors in the following subsections.
4.1 Price rigidities
The rigidity of major industrial prices during the Great Depression was the
object of several economic studies (e.g., Galbraith, 1936, Tucker, 1938), the
most ambitious of which is certainly the empirical inquiry conducted between
1936 and 1939, at the instigation of Harrod, by the Oxford Economists’ Research
Group, and culminating in Hall and Hitch (1939) paper (cf. Besomi, 1998).
Although focusing on business pricing behaviour and apparently pertaining to
the field of industrial economics, the inquiry was connected with the trade cycle,
more specifically with the reciprocal influence of economic fluctuations and firms
behaviour. The principal result of this empirical inquiry consisted in ascribing
to entrepreneurs a full-cost pricing policy, namely the practice of setting the
price on the basis of the average cost computed at some customary output, plus
a given mark-up. Galbraith (1936) had already conjectured this result:
“No matter with what subtlety economists explore the intricacies of marginal costs, it
remains that to the business man it is average costs which are known and understood.
Moreover they are used as a guide to price policy” (Galbraith, 1936, p. 471).
Also, Keynes wittily comments that “it is rare for anyone but an economist to
suppose that price is predominantly governed by marginal cost” (1939, p 407).
Full-cost pricing as a mere rule of thumb is in itself a factor of price rigidity.
But other factors lend rationality to that policy or reinforce its consequences.
One such factor consists in the fact that “changes in price are frequently very
costly, a nuisance to salesmen, and are disliked by merchants and consumers”,
and that “there are conventional prices to which customers are attached” (Hall
and Hitch, 1939, p. 22). Also, producers incur menu costs (Mankiw, 1985)
when changing prices, as already observed by Galbraith (1936):
“Professor Gardiner C. Means has drawn my attention to the cost of making a price
change under modern conditions as an incentive to the holding of prices constant. [...]
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Dealers [must be] informed of the change [... so that the producer] must distribute
new price schedules [.. and] also recast its advertising to acquaint the public with the
change. All of these things cost money and all of this expenditure is avoided if prices
are allowed to stay where they are” (Galbraith, 1936, p. 470, fn.5).
Tucker (1938) makes fundamentally the same remark:
“Manufacturers are compelled to announce in advance what they expect to charge,
frequently before they have any product ready for sale. They have to inform their
salesmen and dealers and in some cases the buying public. They print price lists and
advertisements. Necessarily prices so announced cannot be changed frequently. [...] It
has been necessary for them to announce prices and to stick by their announcement,
or if they diverted from them to do so secretly” (Tucker, 1938, p. 53).
Another factor, possibly more significant still in the context of oligopolistic
competition, lies in the conjectures that may reasonably be ascribed to produc-
ers:
“Although producers do not know what their competitors would do if they cut prices,
they fear that they would also cut. [By contrast,] although they do not know what
competitors would do if they raised prices, they fear that they would not raise them at
all or as much” (Hall and Hitch, 1939, p. 22).
The oligopolist’s belief that his rivals would not follow price increases but would
on the contrary match price decreases makes him face a kinked demand curve,
“the kink occurring at the point where the price, fixed on the ‘full-cost’ principle,
actually stands” (Hall and Hitch, 1939, pp. 22-23). At the same time, Sweezy
(1939) independently introduces a similar “imagined demand curve”, with a
“corner” at the current price:
“If producer A raises his price, his rival producer B will acquire new customers, [a
pleasurable feeling calling for no particular action]. If, on the other hand, A lowers his
price, B will lose customers, [the natural retaliation being a similar cut]. [...] From the
point of view of any particular producer this means simply that if he raises his price he
must expect to lose business to his rivals (his demand curve tends to be elastic going
up), while if he cuts his price he has no reason to believe he will succeed in taking
business away from his rivals (his demand curve tends to be inelastic going down)”
(Sweezy, 1939, pp. 568-569).
Since the marginal revenue curve has a discontinuity at the quantity cor-
responding to the kink, with the marginal cost curve passing between its two
segments, the short-run equilibrium price need not be affected either by a cost
shock or by a demand shock (provided, in this case, the firms continue to refer
to the same conventional price after the shock). Hence,
“Prices so fixed have a tendency to be stable. They will be changed if there is a
significant change in wage or raw material costs, but not in response to moderate or
temporary shifts in demand” (Hall and Hitch, 1939, p. 33).
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Moreover, as the kink refers to some specific conjectural price-output configura-
tion, the kinked demand model leads to equilibrium indeterminacy, so that we
find once again a situation of coordination failures:
“Generally speaking, there may be any number of price-output combinations which
constitute equilibriums in the sense that, ceteris paribus, there is no tendency for the
oligopolist to move away from them. But which of these combinations will be actually
established in practice depends upon the previous history of the case” (Sweezy, 1939,
p. 573).
Sweezy’s conclusion coincides with Hall and Hitch (1939) conclusion: “There
is usually some element in the prices ruling at any time which can only be
explained in the light of the history of the industry” (p. 33).
Besides accounting for price rigidity, the kinked demand model can also
incorporate a cyclical component in price behaviour. Indeed, the demand elas-
ticity may be differently affected by demand shocks above and below the kink:
“It may be suggested that an increase in demand leading to a fuller use of capacity,
more difficulty in getting quick delivery, etc., will make the imagined demand curve less
elastic for upward movements in price. For downward movements in price the result is
likely to be a more elastic curve, since it may be assumed that rivals are less worried
about losses in business and hence less ready to retaliate against a price cut” (Sweezy,
1939, p. 571).
The opposite may be expected in case of a decrease in demand. As a conse-
quence, the gap between the two segments of the marginal revenue curve is
supposed to shrink during a boom, and widen during a recession. Sweezy con-
cludes that, in the latter case, “the producer will be more anxious than ever to
hold his price where it is” (p.572). More generally,
“As far as the cyclical behavior of oligopoly prices is concerned we might expect to
find (1) that prices go up easily and openly in time of upswing; (2) that prices resist
downward pressure in times of recession and depression; and (3) that list prices become
less trustworthy guides to real prices the longer bad times last” (Sweezy, 1939, p. 572).
The last point refers to the possibility of secret price cutting. Such considera-
tions provide a transition to the variability of the aptitude to collude, the second
important determinant of countercyclical markups.
4.2 Collusion variability
As already mentioned, Joan Robinson had already indicated in her argument
against Harrod’s law that “the tendency towards restrictive combinations is
stronger in a slump than in a boom” (Robinson, 1936, pp. 59-60). We find the
same idea in Kalecki (1938):
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“[...] in the slump, cartels are created to save profits and this of course increases
the degree of monopoly, while they are afterwards dissolved in the boom because of
improving prospects of independent activity and the emergence of outsiders” (Kalecki,
1938, p.111).
This source of countercyclicality of the degree of monopoly is extensively
examined in the same year by Abramovitz (1938). He considers the influence of
business cycles on the probability that oligopolistic firms in an industry adopt
a “common policy”, adhering to what would be called nowadays a “best price
guarantee” or a “meeting competition clause” (Salop, 1986), corresponding (un-
der appropriate demand sharing) to the collusive choice of output and prices:6
“If reductions in price are always met by rivals, the output which will maximize profits is
that for which marginal cost equals marginal revenue, reckoned on the assumption that
price-cuts are accompanied by appropriate reduction of rivals’ prices. This definition
of marginal revenue makes it the same for a single member of a market as for a unified
monopoly” (Abramovitz, 1938, p.193).
However, firms do not always adopt such a common policy, because they are
moved by two motives, increasing the size and profitability of the market and
increasing their share of it:7
“Business men are interested not only in exploiting, as well as they can, an established
monopoly position within an industry. They are interested, too, in increasing their
share of the market” (Abramovitz, 1938, p. 196).
The balance between these two motives depends crucially upon the phase of the
cycle:
“When demand is increasing generally, an increased share of the market can be secured
at the expense of a relatively small absolute decrease in the sales of rivals; but when
demand is stationary or falling, all of one’s gains must be at the expense of competitors.
It is, moreover, not only more difficult to detach the old customers of a rival than to
attract new customers, but rivals are likely to struggle harder to keep what they already
have than to secure a proportionate part of an increase of demand. [...Consequently,]
the stage of the cycle most likely to produce prices appropriate to monopoly is that
of recession; while in the later stages of depression, and in revival and prosperity,
6More generally, one may think of other conventional pricing policies and “facilitating
devices” contributing to the competitors’ incentives to cooperate (that is, reducing their in-
centives to compete), despite their partly divergent interests. The significant point in the
present context is that the enforcement of such devices is not time independent (either in the
short or in the long run): “The devices which industries use to help themselves regulate their
competition – such things as trade associations, open-price systems, basing-point systems,
production and inventory statistics – are also affected by the passage of time” (Abramovitz,
1938, p. 213).
7The idea that firms make price and output decisions under two different constraints, one
on their market share, the other on market size, together drawing a kinked demand curve, is
used by d’Aspremont et al. (2007) to parameterize the set of oligopolistic equilibria in terms
of “competitive toughness”.
15
forces appear to be present which tend to bring prices to the position appropriate to
competition” (Abramovitz, 1938, p. 206).
Since the impact of isolated price cuts on producers’ market shares changes
along the cycle, determining (as in Sweezy, 1939) cyclical variations of the in-
dividual demand elasticity, the conjectures about the competitors’ more or less
cooperative attitude are accordingly influenced by the phase of the cycle:
“The downswing of business seems likely to resolve [the doubt about acting indepen-
dently of the industry or not] in favor of cooperation, for we may posit with some
confidence that the demand curves for the products of individual firms drawn on the
assumption that their rivals do not meet price changes will then become more elastic.
[...]. The incursions which one firm can make into the markets of other firms will there-
fore become greater, and the likelihood that price-cuts (if made) will not be met by
rivals smaller. In the upswing, on the other hand, the demand curves for individual
firms become less elastic and our conclusion would be reversed [...]. Then, there is
greater likelihood in depression that prices will approximate the monopoly figure than
in periods of prosperity” (Abramovitz, 1938, p 203).
This portrayed alternation between a fierce competition for market share
during prosperity and a propensity to collude during depression, as well as
the conjectural behaviour built into the kinked demand curve, are peculiar to
the analysis of oligopolistic (not merely imperfect) competition. They take us
away (and not only by reversing the cyclical pattern) from Harrod’s “law of
diminishing elasticity of demand” applying to monopolistic competition. In the
modern New Keynesian revival of these themes of the late thirties, imperfect
competition of the monopolistic type dominates the literature, but we find an
echo to Abramovitz’ analysis in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).8 They consider
a game of price competition a` la Bertrand, and rely on repeated games to show
that any collusive outcome is sustainable as a (perfect) equilibrium provided
that at each step the incentive to deviate is lower than a (tacitly) accepted
(credible) punishment. The basic insight of their model is that the incentive for
a firm to deviate increases with demand, whereas the punishment is independent
of its environment.
For the thirties, Abramovitz’s premonitory description of firms more or less
cooperative attitude along the cycle can be seen as the crest of the imperfect
competition wave in macroeconomics created by Keynes’ conjecture of counter-
cyclical real wages (and procyclical money wages) and by Harrod’s related law.
Such a wave was to vanish within the decade and to form again only more than
four decades later.
8See also Rotemberg and Woodford (1992).
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